

# TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUFI WAY OF LIFE

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## ÖZET

Sufi yaşam tarzı geleneksel ve modern toplumlardaki öncelikleri açısından çözümlenmektedir. Kalp temizliği yoluyla manevi yükseliş tecrübesi ve vurgusundan kutsal davanın popüler yayımına bir kayma vardır. Bu tekno-bilimsel süreçlerin İslamın iç boyutu üzerindeki etkisini belirten bir noktadır. Bugünkü dünyada Sufizm günlük varoluşun özünü oluşturan araçsal rasyonalitenin meydan okuyuşu ile karşı karşıyadır. Geleneksel Sufi doktrini eylemi bugünkü Sufilerin eylem biçimlerinden tamamıyla farklı bir ölçüt temelinde oluşturmayı amaçlar. Bu ölçüt bugünkü dünyada gerçekleşme olananğı bulunmayan aşkın Hakikatın içselleştirilmesidir. Aşkın hakikatın öznel tecrübesi farklı Sufi tarikatları ve kolları arasındaki farklılaşmanın kaynağı olarak rol oynamıştır. Fakat çağdaş sufizm, evrensel ve birleşik bir esenliği vurgulama eğilimindedir. Buna karşın, sufi yaşam tarzının dönüşümü içsel bir gelişme değil, insani değerlerin küresel dönüşümünün bir parçasıdır. Geleneksel Sufi bakış açısı, bugünkü sufi tarikatlarının kitlesel amaçlarına karşıt olarak Hakikate rasyonelite veya ikna konusu olmaktan çok kalp ve tecrübe yoluyla ulaşılabileceğini vurgulamıştır.

## ABSTRACT

Sufi way of life is analysed in terms of its priorities in traditional and modern societies. There is a shift from the experience and emphasis on spiritual ascendance through

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purification of heart to a popular propagation of the divine cause. This is the point expressing the influence of techno-economic processes over the inner dimension of Islam. Sufism in the present world has been confronted and challenged by the instrumental rationality that is the substance of the day-to-day existence. Traditional Sufi doctrine has a claim to constitute action on the basis of a criteria that radically differs from what the Sufis of today are compelled to act. It is the internalization of the transcendental Truth that has no possibility of realization in the present world. Subjective experience of the transcendental truth had played a role as the source of differentiation among different Sufi branches and orders. But, modern sufism are inclined to emphasise universal and unified goal of emancipation. Nevertheless, transformation of the Sufi way of life is a part of global transformation of human values rather than being an internal development. For traditional sufi viewpoint, rather than being a matter of rationality and persuasion Truth was considered to be attained through hearth and experience as opposed to the massive goals of the present sufi orders.

#### **FROM INNER EXPERIENCE TO POWER: CHANGE IN SUFİ PRIORITIES**

Sufism as the spiritual dimension of Islamic life style has a strong emphasis on the role of the heart that has given way to a conception of knowledge and science considered as having a divine character as opposed to the modern sciences aimed at the accumulation of material power through an instrumental treatment of man and nature. Here we can determine some traces of the reformation of the Sufi doctrine from within Sufism itself as a reaction to the external processes reflecting the disenchantment of the world. We can argue that Sufism's present way of dealing with the change brought by scientific technology represents a discontinuity with its traditional outlook although its ideological discourse purports to disallow the penetration of the effects of secularised world into the web of relations it performs. Although it does not conceive man as a techno-scientific creature, it is devoid of putting forth a practical guide in the present world to constitute

the action of its adherents in consistency with what its spiritual worldview preaches.

Conceiving modern way of life as a deviation from the divine truth is a general tendency among the ordinary adherents Sufi circles. Therefore, they connect their economic and political activities to an idea of emancipation from the deviated form of life. Wealth and power as material values are seen as the instrument of attaining non-material goals. Reformation of the Sufi doctrine or the changes within its way of life can be understood not something as the inner developments within Sufism itself but as the result of the necessities of everyday life. But the justification of the change is provided from within Sufism.

Sufism provides an alternative to the prevailing mass culture, but its alternative is another mass culture. TVs, and video sets and computer mediated communication are the means to contribute to the spiritual inner developments of the adherents. How can one see the God in a man-made environment? A possible answer from a Sufic vision says that since everything even the most sophisticated technological innovation is finite compared with the eternity of God. Moreover, scientific discoveries and exploring the unknown aspects of the nature can be seen as supporting rather than opposing such views of Sufism. But since knowledge is not divorced from power, the idea and practice of inner spirituality become proliferated as dependent on the electronic and mechanic agents of scientific technology and as independent from the subjectivity that is the distinguishing aspect of the Sufi paradigm. Modern science in a great extent is applied science and in this sense becomes a rival to the Sufic claim for the constitution of action. It transforms the nature of action from transcendental constitution or inspiration into an 'immanent' constitution that is explained in the sociological tradition as the rationalisation of action or as the disenchantment of the world.

Since the doctrinary roots of Sufic vision rests in the preindustrial period it becomes a basic social scientific issue whether there is a shift in Sufic priorities as a result of industrialization, modernization and Western domination that shapes life style of the general society. In this sense, The religious

change in Indonesia and Morocco is analysed by Geertz in terms of a distinction between "religiousness" and "religious-mindedness", between being held by religious conviction and holding them, between the spiritual power of religious symbols and their spiritual reputation (Geertz 1968:61). The former ones in this distinction represent the classical Islamic styles marked by beliefs and practices which can be called 'mystical', while the latter represent 'scripturalism' which has been the consequence of the religious transformation in both cases for more than one and half century (ibid:24). Although 'mysticism' was the mainstream classical Islamic style, it took different forms in each case because of the sort of collective life within which and along with which they evolved. Moroccan Islam became activist, rigorous and dogmatic, while Indonesian Islam became syncretic, reflective, multifarious and strikingly phenomenological (ibid:20). Islam turns out 'to develop a characteristic conception of what life was all about, a conception they called Islamic, to mean rather different things in the two cases' (ibid:54).

Despite the otherworldly ideas and activities so often associated with it, Sufism, as an historical reality, consists of a series of different and even contradictory experiments, most of them occurring between the ninth and nineteenth centuries, in bringing orthodox Islam (itself no seamless unity) into effective relationship with the world, rendering it accessible to its adherents and its adherents accessible to it. In the Middle East, this seems mainly to have meant reconciling Arabian Pantheism with Koranic legalism; in Indonesia, restating Indian illuminationism in Arabic phrases; in West Africa, defining sacrifice, possession, exorcism, and curing as Muslim rituals (ibid:48).

What Indonesians and Moroccans have in common 'is what planets and pendulums have in common: looked at in the proper light, their very differences connects them' (ibid:55). The differences between them stems from the fact that Sufism in Islam has been less a definite standpoint than a multiplicity of local forms of faith. It is prone to come to terms with a variety of mentalities, while maintaining the essence Islam's own identity.

For Geertz as a result of the religious change the main-line traditions-illuminationism in Indonesia and maraboutism in Morocco-'not only no longer have the hegemony they once had, they do not even have the definition'. They still remain the basic religious orientations in their respective countries. 'Substantively, they have not changed'. What has changed is their sense that their dominance is complete and their position is secure (ibid:60). 'In Indonesia as in Morocco, the collision between what the Koran reveals, or what Sunni (that is, orthodox) tradition has come to regard it as revealing, and what man who call themselves Muslims actually believe is becoming more and more inescapable'. Because of the striking multiformity of modern consciousness, the task of Islam to inform the faith of the particular men becomes ever more difficult. What is believed to be true has not changed. 'What has changed is the way in which it is believed. Where there once was faith, there now are reasons, and not very convincing ones; what once was deliverances are now hypotheses, and rather strained ones' (ibid:17). Geertz argues that most of the Moroccans and Indonesians alternate between religiousness and 'religious-mindedness with such a variety of speeds and in such a variety of ways that it is very difficult in any particular case to tell where the one leaves off and the other begins'. Alterations are more than just intellectual reorientations or bodiless changes of the mind. 'They are also, and more fundamentally, social processes, transformations in the quality of life' (ibid:18). The loss of spiritual self-confidence underlies this process. Religious change of the past two centuries indicates a progressive increase in doubt. What people doubt is their belief not its validity. Therefore on the spiritual level the question has shifted from "What shall I believe?" to "How shall I believe it?" Religious-mindedness, *celebrating belief rather than what belief asserts*, is actually a response to this sort of doubt. As a result of the profound changes ideological assertions becomes the basis of Muslims' religiosity. For the Muslims this transformation has, as Geertz (ibid:61-62) implies, a universal significance:

The problem is that these days naturalness seems increasingly difficult actually to attain. Everything is growing terribly deliberate, Willed, studied, *voulu*.

Victims, in this dimension, are discovering that though the religious traditions...are accessible...to them, the certitude those traditions produced is not. The transformation of religious symbols from imagistic revelations of the divine, evidences of God, to ideological assertions of the divine's importance, badges of piety, has been in each country, though in different ways, the common reaction to this disheartening discovery.

Three developments having profound impact shook the old order as thoroughly as capitalism, Protestantism and nationalism shook it in the West. These are: the establishment of Western domination; the increasing influence of scholastic, legalistic, and doctrinal, that is to say, scriptural Islam; and the crystallisation of an activist nation-state. Although the stimulus of change is external, its realisation is internal. This means that religious change a response to the external impact. 'Whatever its outside provocations, and whatever foreign borrowing may be involved, modernity, like capital, is largely made at home' (ibid:21). Western domination created the conditions in which an oppositional, identity-preserving, willed Islam whose content is provided by scripturalism emerges. It produced a reaction not only against Christianity but against the classical religious traditions of the Muslim countries themselves (ibid:65). Scripturalism, on the one hand is a reaction to the new qualities of life, on the other hand indicates a discontinuity with the classical Islam.

A similar analysis of the transformation of Muslim way of life is carried by Gellner. His view of the traditional Islam is based on a distinction and opposition between High Islam of the scholars and Low Islam of the people, between the orthodox centre and deviant error, knowledge and ignorance, political order and anarchy, civilisation and barbarism, town and tribe, Holy Law and mere human custom, a unique deity and usurper middlemen of the sacred (Gellner 1981:5; 1992:9). For Gellner, Weber 'favoured the view that the institutional preconditions of modern capitalism were not restricted to the West, but that it was ideological element which provides the crucial differentia' explaining the capitalist development in the West. He defends the reverse of Weber's

argument by claiming that 'ideological parallels to Christianity can be found, but they operate in a contrasted institutional milieu....The distinction would seem to be less in the absence of ideological elements than in the particular balance of power which existed between the various institutions in that society'. Since central, official, 'pure' variant of Islam was egalitarian and scholarly, it satisfies the 'protestant' ideal of equal access. However, the old great tradition of Islam 'became the folk version under modern conditions' in the sense that it is now the natural idiom, helps that folk to define itself against foreigners, against westernised rulers, and against its own disavowed, 'backward' rustic past' (1981:5-6).

As such Gellner rejects Weber's thesis that it is the ideological feature of the Muslim religion distinguishing it from the Puritan religion and prevented the development of rational ethic through a discipline over life has led Muslim society to traditionalization. For Weber although in the first Meccan period of Islam there was a tendency to withdraw from the world, in Madina with the evolution of the early Islamic communities, the religion was transformed into an Arabic warrior religion. 'The role played by wealth accruing from spoils of war and from political aggrandizement in Islam is diametrically opposed to the role played by wealth in Puritan religion. The Muslim tradition depicts with pleasure the luxurious raiment, perfume, and meticulous beard-coiffure of the pious' (Weber 1978: 623-624). 'There was nothing in ancient Islam like an individual quest for salvation, nor was there any mysticism. The religious promises in the earliest period of Islam pertained to this world. Wealth, power, and glory were all martial promises, and even the world beyond is pictured in Islam as a soldier's sensual paradise. Moreover, the original Islamic conception of sin has a similar feudal orientation' (ibid: 625). 'The ideal personality type in the religion of Islam was not the scholarly scribe (*Literat*), but the warrior' (ibid: 626). Asceticism in Islam 'was the asceticism of a military caste, of a martial order of knights, not of monks. Certainly it was not a middle-class ascetic systematization of the conduct of life. Moreover, it was effective only periodically, and even then it tended to merge into fatalism....Islam was diverted completely from any real methodical

control of life by the advent of the cult of the saints, and finally by magic' (ibid: 627). 'Puritan could demonstrate his religious merit precisely in his economic activity. He acted in business with the best possible conscience, since through his rationalistic and legal behaviour in his business activity he was factually objectifying the rational methodology of his total life pattern' (ibid: 616).

Within the sociological tradition Weber's rationalization thesis has been considered as having primary significance in understanding the general features of an industrial civilization. Rationalization is a process made up of a variety of basic processes such as secularization, intellectualization, and the systematization of the everyday life. As argued by Holton and Turner (1989: 68) 'Rationalization created the conditions for a stable administrative system, a systematic framework of legal relations, the dominance of natural science within the intellectual understanding of reality, and the spread of a variety of systems of human control and regularization'.

However, Weber's thesis of the ideological distinctivity of Protestantism has been severely criticised. In rejecting Weber's thesis that rationalism was a peculiar feature of the Protestant asceticism that had given way to capitalism Maxime Rodinson (1974) insists that that rationalistic ethic was not the cause of capitalism but rather a development within the capitalist system. For him Islam is not contrary to the development of capitalism as envisioned by Weber. As argued by Morris (1987: 87), Weber aimed to 'highlight those aspects of the Judeo-Christian tradition that were consonant with the development of worldly asceticism and to play down the mystical, ritualistic, and magical elements of that tradition, and, conversely, to overlook the rational and ethical orientation of the non-western religions'.

In Turner's (1978) view the distinctions between Islam and Protestantism do not appear in such a degree that could direct it to follow such a separate way. Then he criticizes Weber for his misinterpretation of the cultural history of Islam. He (1974) criticises Weber for not following his own interpretative methodology in relation to Islam in his sociology of religion.

The model of the traditional Muslim civilisation elaborated by Gellner is an attempt to fuse Ibn Khaldun's political sociology



with David Hume's oscillation theory of religion (Gellner 1981:35). In his model, tribal segmentation is the basic rule and 'the tribe is both an alternative to the state and also its image, its limitation and the seed of a new state'. The 'segmentary' picture is predominated and justified by 'decentralisation, diffusion of power, generalised participation in violence and order enforcement, mutual opposition of groups similar in scale and occupation, and occurring simultaneously at a number of levels of size, the absence of a specialised and more or less permanent class of warrior-rulers' (ibid:38-39). Sufism is seen as a catalyst in maintaining the tribal (dis)order and the spiritual dimension of Islam in the 'segmentary tribal society' in which the living saint is the most characteristic religious institution. Being part of the saintly lineage the typical saint is routinised and is the justification of the hereditary charisma rather than being an individual virtuoso performance as it is within Christianity. Selected by birth the saints as the arbitrators and mediators play the role of compromise between the state and anarchy. They have the same stability and continuity as that which is possessed by the segmentary group. The faith of the tribesman requires hierarchy and incarnation in persons, not in script. In this sense, for Gellner (ibid:41), the saints perform the following roles:

Supervising the political process in segmentary groups, e.g. election or selection of chiefs.

Supervising and sanctioning their legal process, notably by collective oath.

Facilitating economic relations, by guaranteeing caravans and visits to the markets of neighbouring tribes; trade and pilgrimage routes may converge.

Providing spatial markers for frontiers: a saintly settlement may be on the border between lay groups.

Providing temporal markers; in a pastoral society, many pasture rights may be bounded by seasons require rituals for their ratifications. What better than a saintly festival for such a purpose?

Supplying the means for the Islamic identification of the tribesmen. The tribesmen are no scholars. Not to

put too fine a point on it, they are illiterate. They have neither the taste nor the equipment for the scholarly piety of a scripturalist urban faith.

However, with the coming of modernity the traditional stability and internal rotation of the Muslim society end and therefore the swinging pendulum becomes unhinged. This means, for him, the decline of tribalism as a result of the effective centralisation of the power of state in the modern period. The new situation 'tilts the entire balance in favour of urban styles of life as against tribal one'. Although 'the scripturalist style of faith is modernizable; the tribal and saintly one is not' (ibid:56-58). Mobility and literacy that is connected with the political centralisation is the first impact of modern world over Islam.

The process of industrialisation contributed for the victory of Law against Heterodoxy. Second outcome is the rise of fundamentalism against modernity. There is an affinity between the political needs of the period of industrialisation or 'development' and scripturalist rigorism or fundamentalism. This is because industrialisation calls for much discipline and self-sacrifice, for self discipline above all, and for orderliness and literacy, the obedience to abstract rules, imposed by central and as it were disembodied authority. One has to perform one's duties *religiously*. Traditional situation, for Gellner, engendered tension between rural superstition and urban utilitarianism, but the modern situation on the one hand make it socially and intellectually attractive a true, pristine, pure faith from the superstitious accretions, on the other hand it leads to the demand for a new social order requiring total attitudes. Sufism can and indeed do live in the modern world but without its basic characteristics. Then in Gellner's (ibid:60-62) view the new situation can be summed as:

If disabused Marxist sometimes turn to Buddhism, disabused Kemalists (or Nasserites) may turn to Sufism (but refined, urban-apartment Sufism is no longer the same as the annual pilgrimage/festival of a tribal segment)...Contemporary Sufism is ...proscribed, but its historical manifestations acclaimed as achievements of local culture.

Gellner has been criticized on the basis of the idea that he uses the main Orientalist framework especially in his binary polarization of the Muslim society and distorts the nature of Khaldun's work. Ibn Khaldun in Lawrence's view (1984: 5) 'was not a famous Muslim scholar before he achieved fame among non-Muslims of expansionist Europe'. He is a product of Orientalism and it is highly questionable to which extent he can be assessed apart from the Orientalist interest. J.W. Anderson's (1984: 111-112, 114) critique questions the mainstream treatment of traditional texts by the modern scholarship:

The significance of Ibn Khaldun for anthropology has to be sought in the discipline's dual roots in social philosophy, particularly in the rationalizing nature of the Enlightenment, and in that direct involvement with other ways of life which is the hallmark of the discipline. Relating the other ways of life to terms which include our own, and generalizing on that relationship, has been the central task embraced by the discipline. From such an ambivalent perspective, Ibn Khaldun has been claimed as one of the precursors of viewpoints which emerged in the European Enlightenment following the age of discovery...Gellner incorporates Ibn Khaldun's text into his own, not as part of the context but by supplementing it with data from contemporary ethnographies and through a reinterpretation that draws heavily on David Hume's pessimistic opinion' that men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and to sink again from theism to idolatry Gellner 'generalizes E. E. Evans Prichard's analysis of lineage fission and fusion in societies without institutionalized leadership into "principle".

Anderson (ibid: 120) concludes that:

What Ibn Khaldun seems to be interested in goes beyond description as an end in itself to the moral purpose of description. And from that perspective, his is an analysis which defies translation into the ideal typifications of the sorts of Enlightenment-derived

social philosophies offered by Gellner as superior accounts. To do what Gellner does is to sacrifice the specificity of Ibn Khaldun's affinities and to dissolve their terms into categories or approximations of something else. From an anthropological point of view, this is to conjure with Ibn Khaldun rather than to penetrate his thoughts on the significance of forces and events in his examination of human actions. It is worth noting in conclusion that the last chapters of the *Muqaddimah* deal with increasingly practical matters, straightforwardly evaluated on the basis of Ibn Khaldun's analytical groundwork.

In spite of the critics' views about the Orientalist mood in Gellner's thesis, we concentrate more on the explanatory power of his approach to change as the unhinging of the pendulum and of the puritan character of the modern Islam. Although Gellner admits that Ottoman Empire contradicts his model since it was long-lived and based on an artificial elite rather than the tribes (Gellner 1981: 73-74), here what is important for us is the character of Ottoman state in terms of its contacts with the local communities. Ottoman state had favoured the autonomous communities. It could rely on the various communities to run their own affairs internally but, the division of labour created by modernity is 'incompatible with the political and economic specialization of entire communities' (ibid: 59). As a result of nationalism each community tries to create its own state.

Sufism is seen by Mardin as a rural phenomenon in the early history of the Turks in a similar manner to Gellner and Geertz. For him when the Central Asian Turks accepted Islam they did not approved its features which were not consistent with their pastoral structures. Sufism was the most consistent belief to Shamanism. The Turkish elites who were living in the city accepted Islam as it was but the Turkish tribes outside the city civilisation and those who stayed at the countryside and who were not among the elites preferred the heterodox, Sufi form of Islam (Mardin 1986:70-71). But the attachment of Turkic people to the Sunni tradition was assured by the total 'package' offered by the Naqshbandi Sufism which involved a synthesis of orthodoxy and heterodoxy.

Naqshbandi devotion to one's spiritual guide is seen as similar to the leadership pattern found among the Turkmen tribes (Mardin 1991:124). For Mardin the formative periods of the Ottoman Empire is in a sense the history of the struggles between those who accepted the heterodox Islam and those who wanted to make Islam sovereign everywhere. But in time Sufism was institutionalised and became consistent With the Sunni Islam. Coordination between these two institutions was realised in their functioning as the parts of the legitimate state mechanism. Through their loyalty to certain *tariqas*, guilds entered into the state structures. However, *tariqas* played a significant role in the formation of the non-statist movements. Whatever their contact with the state the mystic orders remained outside the state regimentation and close to the artisan corporations and to the people (Berkes 1964: 16).

Mardin (1986:72-75) counts three additional functions of the *tariqas*: As educational centres they represented the spread of the views other than those of the official ulema, they contributed to the resistance of the masses against the representatives of the state, they prepared the ground for the social differentiation when it was constrained. In the Ottoman society the *tariqas* was a shelter for the people. Art, literature, and science in a great extend were developed by the *tariqas*. A heterodox culture which was parallel to the religious culture became widespread among the Ottoman people so that Sufism become the culture of the Anatolian countryside. The religious activities of the people were shaped by the influence of the *tariqas*, although they did not completely reflect a *tariqa* conception. In modern Turkey with the official abolition of the Sufi orders an unformed Sufism has played a function among the different clusters of people as the basis of their beliefs.

In a similar manner Sunar and Toprak see Islam in the Ottoman Empire at two levels: at the centre there was a scripturalist, *sharia*-minded, *ulema*-governed orthodoxy; at the periphery it included sects, religious orders and saints. The non-circulation of elites resisted the place for the pendulum swing and ensured the stability of the Empire. Through guilds, *kadi* and *medrese* the centre exercised control over the periphery which 'was

itself highly fragmented, particularistic, segmental and with low access between groups' (Sunar and Toprak 1983: 422-423). In their view the policy of the centre was seen as manipulative of this division and the peripheral groups as unable to transcend their particularism and to develop unitarian movements. The notion of dichotomy between centre and periphery has been considered as the key for understanding the Turkish Islamic tradition. The survival of Islam in periphery gave way to the Islamic revitalization movements as urbanization and industrialization penetrated into the nucleus of rural life, and mobilized the masses. In modern Turkey the recent Islamic revitalization is considered as having a peripheral background (Ayata 1991: 223-224). Republican ideology has not provided an alternative value system which could replace the role of people's Islam that in the long run has become the ground for the revivalist movements representing the dissatisfactions with the secular policies. In Mardin's (1986:109) view, the distinction between the culture of the people and intellectual culture has continued to exist in the Republican Turkey. Official ideology and the Republican elites have underemphasized the role played by the folk Islam by seeing it as mere superstition that could easily be replaced by the modernising ideology of the state. This has been the main reason behind the weakness of the Kemalist ideology which could not play the role of an alternative ideology since it did not create a new meaning in the level of the personality creation of culture. In the same manner islamic intellectuals who attempt to modernise religion presupposed that there is a single Islam. Sometimes they have met with an Islam which they have never known. However such approaches to the folk Islam have seen beneficial for the aims of the Shaikhs and Imams who could speak the same language with the peasants since they have known and considered the 'superstition' seriously.

Against the view, that the change in the recent period of the Islamic world can be explained in terms of radical discontinuities against its tradition, that is promoted by Geertz and Gellner, Fustfeld considers Islam in the modern period in its essence in a sense of continuity. Firstly, he disagree to divide the Islamic society into two polarised segments as the literate and scholarly urban Muslims pursuing a "scripturalist" or "puritan" style of

religiosity on the one hand, and illiterate Muslims of the tribal countryside finding their soul in the tombs and descendants of local saints. Secondly, Fusfeld disagrees the universality of the view that Muslims responded to the Western domination 'by shifting their religiosity to a more abstract and universal interpretation of Islam (based on the Qur'an, Hadith, etc.) and rejecting their traditions' (Fusfeld 1984:89-90).

The universality of the explanations especially their view that change in Muslim society indicates a discontinuity with its traditional heritage Gellner and Geertz offer is rejected by Fusfeld on the basis of the evidences related to the Naqshbandi order particularly its Mucaddidiyya branch. For him Geertz's 'scripturalist reaction' and 'maraboutic' Islam of the countryside expresses the same dichotomies and discontinuities which make up the poles of Gellner's pendulum, namely the urban ulema and the saints of the countryside. The treating Sufism as a rural phenomenon reflects the common tendency in the writing of Islamic history by the western scholars. Gellner's arguments about the Urban Saints and mysticism do not reflect the roles they have played throughout the history of Islam. Then Sufism cannot 'be relegated to the realm of an illiterate "folk tradition" separate from the literate "Great Tradition" of Islamic urban centres'. Fusfeld claims that change does not come only or even primarily from socially "marginal men" or from radical reformers, as Geertz and Gellner imply. Rather, it 'emerges most significantly among those who pretend most that they have not changed' (ibid:91-92). Therefore change is seen by him not as a discontinuity with the tradition but as a local adaptation to the new conditions.

The case of the Sufi tradition of Mirza Mazhar in India indicates that universal aspects of Islamic faith were emphasised but they were understood in the context of the local manifestations of Islamic institutions. 'The role of the *Shaikh* as the representative of universal Islam was complementary to his local leadership'. An incident of locality was indicated in Mirza Mazhar's and his first successor Shah Ghulam Ali's forbidding the pilgrimage to Mecca. Mazhar was referred as the Ka'ba of his followers. Moreover the miracles attributed to him supports the locality of the of the Sufi

circle (ibid:94-95). Not only the guidance offered to disciples along the mystic path but also community leadership and local identity should be considered among the roles performed by the *Shaikh*, 'Abu'l Khair, successor to Mirza Mazhar saw the need for solidarity among Muslims in light of the position of weakness which they found themselves around the world'. He did not attempt to create a political movement, since it would ultimately be to the disadvantage of the Muslim community. He elicited a strong feeling of identification with Islam among his followers as an abstract and unitary faith. The emphasis on the Shaikh's special role as mediator between man and God increased, while the more "worldly" aspects of saintly mediation were de-emphasised. This 'had its roots in the traditional denigration of the worldly affairs. Such denigration had been a means to illustrate the subordination of worldly realm to the authority of the Shaikh. It now came to be, however, more an avoidance of the world as a source of disturbance and even danger' (ibid:105). Although the improvement of the inner being had always been the essential aim of the Sufi Shaikh, it became both essential aim and exclusive means for him to use in his mission by the late nineteenth century.

As a conclusion to his criticism of Gellner and Geertz, Fusfeld (ibid:107) asserts;

An urban-based, literate Sufi circle, with historical continuity symbolised by its khanqah at the grave-site of its founder and his successors, and with its own tradition of scripturalist study and reformist mission, while it must, no doubt, confound attempts at simple classification, is surely not an institution whose significance may be dismissed on its face.

The tension between the Law and the idea of inner development has been an inseparable aspect of the traditional Islam. It contributed to the realisation and justification of the diversity of experiences so that the ideal of plurality was realised all around the Muslim world. Although Sufism has an institutional, a formal aspect, the worldview it promoted was widely held by the people of all sort. In this sense it is an error to equate Sufism with the membership of a tariqa. This is because it emphasised the role



of particular experiences which represents difference against the abstract Law or scientific generalisation that represents uniformity. Then it can be argued that transcendental conception of reality as the common characteristic of the 'traditions' is the source of the justification of diversity. And in reality it is this way of looking at the world which was transformed by the disenchanting Protestant attitude. As a consequence of this attitude instrumental value has become the absolute measure of anything to have a value at all. As argued by Geertz differences of life styles among the Muslims were the mainstream tendency until the modernity represented by the process of industrialisation had profound impacts over them. Industrialisation and nation-state has given to the development of an abstract, uniform, universalist and puritan briefly scripturalist Islam. This is consistent with 'the fact that the decline of Sufism coincided with the Muslim struggle for freedom in Asia and Africa early this century' (Khalid 1973:65).

The close connection between uniformity represented by fundamentalism or scripturalism in Geertz's view and industrialisation as Gellner indicates, explains the paradox of the mystical dimension of Islam in the modern world. However, Gellner's Sufism as a rural phenomenon cannot explain much of the historical reality. Sufism has been a rural as well as an urban version of Islamic way of life as argued above by Fufeld on the basis of concrete cases of urban Sufism. Throughout Islamic history Sufism has been an attractive worldview and way of life for the city dwellers. The tension and conflict between *ulema* and *Shaikhs* between *madrassa* and *tekke* reflect the inner dynamism of the traditional Islam. In the cities there were as many lodges (*tekke*) as the number of the mosques (İz 1995:28). The great part of the intellectual and practical development within Islam was realised within its Sufic version in the context of city life.

However, conceiving modern-urban Sufism as unaffected by the all-encompassing processes of secularisation is devoid of seeing its traditional characteristics. Sufism has been subjected to continuous change so it either develop an unacknowledged compromise with the present way of life and in this way becomes a part of the instrumental/techno-scientific reality without

substantially changing its traditional doctrinary outlook. Or Sufism goes to reevaluate its traditional doctrine and way of experience in accordance with the overwhelming necessities of the present reality. The social relations which exist within the *tariqa* network are not the same which existed even fifty years ago. The functions of the *tariqa* are not the same as they were (Mardin 1977:281). In this sense Geertz's view concerning ideologization of religiosity explains us the vital transformation in the faith of Muslims. But ideologization of religious belief can be seen as a result of the techno-scientific constitution of the daily actions of Muslims rather than the multiformity of the life experiences. Techno-scientific reality presupposes a universal, abstract and ideological assertion of faith. This stems from the fact that people experience uniformity rather than multiformity in the process of 'disheartening development'.

### CONCLUSIONS

Sufism has not an independent course of development from the structural transformation of life pattern which has been accompanied by change in consciousness. Here in order not to fall into the traps of both social scientific analysis and ideological assertions, two points must be clarified. Firstly, the view that change in great part in the non-western societies come from above as a consequences of the manoeuvres of the ruling centre contributes both to the concealment of the changing substance of life and for this reason to the ideological assertion that what must be captured and changed is the power of the state. Change comes from above and outside, which antedates the formation of the nation states which is based on and has been creating not real but imagined identities. As argued by B. Anderson (1991:46) 'the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation'. Technologization of the state apparatus does means that there is no group of people having a control over the state institutions. State and society are arranged on the basis of technical requirements that are not determined by the special interest of any group in society. In this sense Islamic will to

power represents a long lasting paradox that stems from ignoring the techno-scientific character of public and private life.

The paradox of Islamic will to power stems from the misinterpretation of the nature of the present order, from seeing technology as dependent on the will of its users. As the daily actions of the adherents of a Sufi circle is not conditioned by intrinsic Sufi values, Islamic ideology's rise to power does not change the existing features of action in a profound way. We can determine two main points in understanding the nature of modern Sufism: mass politicization through belief on the one hand and subjectivist illusion on the other. Members of a Sufi order or even more generally the Muslim people in great numbers do still believe in the supernatural powers and in the currency of Shaikhs' spiritual influence (*barakah*). This is a continuation of their traditional belief. This sort of belief is not a part of political ideology in the modern sense since it predates the emergence of the ideologies of all kind. But the use of this belief as a generalized cause is the consequence of the changing priorities of sufi way of life. General cause and mass mobilization have roots in processes of industrialization that is based on massive reproduction of everything. Experience of truth through purification of hearth reflects sponteneity and autenticity of belief while emphasis of divine cause indicates multiplication and homogenization of the beleivers. Secondly, analysis of human relations and actions within closed systems as 'society' and 'group' in social science leads to an idea of a distinction and opposition between 'internal' (dynamism) and 'external' (imposition) factors. This view conceals the autonomous development and rules of efficiency of the techno-scientific mechanism and its global, value-free and context-unbound modes of operations. This is, then, a problem as much for social sciences as for Sufism. In both cases predominance of imagery category conceals the real course of action. In brief, in understanding substance of everyday life we have no benefit from a spesific and social conception of the constitution of action.

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